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PANEL IV:
THE LIMITS ON JUDICIAL POWER IN
ORDERING REMEDIES*

CIVIL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
FRANK

H.

EASTERBROOK**

I want to make a point so simple it's simple-minded: Most
disputes over remedies in civil rights cases have nothing'to do
with remedies and everything to do with substantive entitlements. Remedies are designed to track entitlements, to give
people their due. When we hear an objection to the remedy, it
is almost always a disguised objection to the definition of what
is due, and not to the methods used to apply the balm. To define appropriate remedies, then, we must examine our underf
standing of rights.
Because this point is so obvious that almost everyone will
deny it, I will proceed by example through some contemporary
remedial questions. In thinking about each subject, it will help
to consider three questions. First, who holds the "rights': individual persons or groups of persons? Second, what does
"equality" mean: equal treatment .or equal outcomes? Third,
what do we expect the government to teach -us: the-importance
of disregarding the characteristics that often are chosen as a
basis of private, discrimination, or the worth of a society in
which persons of diverse backgrounds appear side by side? The
principle that race is irrelevant to public favor is exceedingly
powerful and important, and it has sound constitutional footing, but many persons of good will who accept this principle
believe that for now we must "rise above principle" to provide
redress.
There are systematic differences in emphasis between those
who think on the one hand that rights are personal, that the
government should assure equal treatment, and that it should
teach people the irrelevance of race (for example), and, on the
other, those who believe that rights belong to groups, that
equality of outcomes is most important, and that the govern* This panel was introduced by Paul Brest, Dean, Stanford Law School.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
The Law School, University of Chicago. Copyright © 1991 by Frank H. Easterbrook.
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ment should assure diversity in many walks of life. I shall call
the former set the individual-rights cluster and the latter the
group-rights cluster. My purpose is not to discuss which set of
substantive norms is correct-or whether, given the nature of
public choice, it will be possible to restore the principle of
color-blindness in the long run if we disregard it systematically
in what has become an extended "short run"'-but to show
that the conclusions we reach on these questions govern the
choice of remedy.
1. Termination ofschool desegregationdecrees. The objective of desegregation decrees is a unitary school system. Once that has
been achieved, management is returned to political control.
Agreement on this formula does not yield much agreement on
concrete practices. What makes a school district "unitary"?
Does the prospect of "resegregation" after the termination of a
decree mean that the court should keep the injunction in force?
Is a desegregation order a temporary expedient to blur the racial identity of schools, or is it a permanent revision of the way
students are assigned, to be modified only to prevent some new
wrong? These are among the most pressing problems in school
cases, and they have divided the courts of appeals as they have
divided the profession. 2
Everything depends on distinguishing "discrimination" from
"segregation." The latter is a multi-purpose term that includes
(a) ongoing official discrimination, (b) the contemporary effects
of yesterday's official discrimination, and (c) the outcome of
private residential choices. Such a range of meanings makes the
term useful in rhetoric but less useful in analysis. The only constitutionally objectionable kind of "segregation" is the kind the
government creates, because the Constitution applies only to
official action. Decisions that leave the private kind in place do
not offend the Constitution even though they may offend ideas
of equality.
To persons who hold the individual-rights cluster of views, a
change in the ratio of student populations is irrelevant; the
government's obligation is to ignore race rather than to achieve
1. Jennifer Roback's paper in this volume discusses this question insightfully. See
HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 58 (1991).
2. Compare Riddick v. Norfolk School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986) with Dowell v.
Oklahoma Bd. of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1521
(1990) and Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989). Cf Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989).

Roback, The Separation of Race and State, 14
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a particular outcome. People who hold this constellation of
substantive views will see nothing wrong with large changes in
racial balance of particular schools when a decree is lifted, because none of the change may be attributed to official discrimination. Persons who hold the group-rights constellation of
substantive views will try to prevent the lifting of decrees when
racial imbalance would follow. There is nothing distinctly "remedial" about either position.
This debate is related to questions concerning the kinds of
errors a court should accept in formulating plans in the first
place. It is difficult to tell the genesis of racial imbalance in a
school system. Was it discrimination over the years? Private
choices unrelated to governmental action? Some mixture? Persons who define rights from the perspective of groups and emphasize results almost uniformly believe that courts should
resolve against the government all debatable questions of causation. This means assuming that all racial imbalance needs extirpation. To a degree the assumption of causation by official
acts has been embraced by all-when discrimination produces
"racial identity" of schools that must be destroyed, fine questions of causation cannot be answered-but the question is of
course to what degree?' Inevitable and desirable overbreadth in
the initial remedy does not imply that the Constitution itself
compels the government to create a school system that is "desegregated" in the secular as opposed to the legal sense.
2. "Tipping points" in school and housing desegregation. The mirror image is that holders of the individual-rights duster conclude that claims about "tipping points" in school or housing
discrimination should not affect a court's remedial choice. The
judge's job is to get rid of governmental discrimination and its
effects. If in a world without governmental discrimination, private choice (including bigoted choice) produces racial separation, or lower funding for schools as well-to-do flee the
jurisdiction, this is n6t an objection to the remedy. Private discrimination neither increases nor reduces the entitlement: to
have the government act without regard to race. 4
The consent decree governing desegregation of the Chicago
3. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Keyes v. Denver School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973).
4. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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public schools posed a question of this sort. It was negotiated
by litigants committed to the group-rights cluster of views, and
it included provisions barring deviation in any direction from
an approved racial mix. Black, Filipino, and Native American
children who were turned down for admission to a magnet
school on the ground that their admission would produce "too
many" members of their race-perhaps lead to "tipping"sought judicial relief. The decree said to persons who had
heard this refrain too often: "We have enough of your kind." A
majority of our court was unsympathetic to these claims; a minority argued, on individual-rights grounds, that the students
were entitled to admission without regard to their race.5 Nothing even remotely "remedial" underlay this dispute.
One thing that should trouble everyone is the interaction between racial-balance remedies and the willingness of the public
to pay for education. Strong requirements of balance deny to
residential communities-black and white-the option of increasing their own taxes to pay for better education. Many ethnic groups have poured extra resources into the education of
their children. When judicial decrees break the link between
residence and school, when no one has a "local" school (one
overlapping the taxing jurisdiction), then no one has a strong
reason to tax himself for education. Racial-balance remedies
lead to pressure for equal statewide funding. Gains from
"equal" funding are likely to be counterbalanced by a lower
aggregate level, as local school districts lose the incentive (and
sometimes lose the legal right) to enrich their schools. Neither
the individual-rights cluster nor the group-rights cluster has
much to say about this, one of the few distinctly "remedial"
questions. Perhaps it is not surprising that this link has received
correspondingly little attention. Disregard of "remedial" issues
that are not driven by one's view of the merits is a telling sign of
how little there is to the law of "remedies."
3. Judicially-imposedtaxes. Whether a judge may order school
officials to levy taxes depends on whether the Constitution creates a right to "quality" education. It is similar in spirit to the
tipping-point dispute (is there a right to integrated education?). If the constitutional right is only to equality, then courts
5. See Samayoa v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 798 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied,
807 F.2d 643, 647 (dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. granted, vacated,
and remanded, 485 U.S. 951 (1988).
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cannot justify directing school districts to raise more money.
Available money, however little, can be shared equally; quality
may diminish without federal objection based on equality. But
if there is a right to quality education, perhaps on a "freezing"
rationale, 6 then the judge must have the power to direct the
raising of the necessary revenue. Whether he specifies the taxes
or just directs that the money appear, leaving others to figure
out how (perhaps by reducing expenses on roads), is the only
''remedial" question.
The dispute about taxation to pay for the remedy in Kansas
City illustrates the point.7 The judge first required the school
district to implement a very expensive remedial package, including more than $260 million in capital improvements: new
schools, plus such improvements as swimming' pools and air
conditioning at existing schools. When a statute requiring voters' approval for capital expenditures blocked access to financing, the court ordered the state and local governments to raise
taxes to supply the necessary money. The Supreme Court held
that the direct imposition of taxes was an improper remedy, but
it concluded that the court nonetheless could direct the school
district to come up with the money, and to facilitate this could
enjoin the application of the rule requiring the voters' approval. The upshot was that school officials obtained a taxing
power that state law denied them, and they were obliged to use
this power to fund the decree.
If the decree was proper-if indeed the Constitution required
$260 million in capital improvements plus other expensive
steps-then it follows almost inevitably that the court may
override local laws blocking access to the money. If the Constitution requires states to pay for property they take, then a local
law forbidding the levying of taxes for this purpose could not
stand; the definition of the federal right implies an obligation
to raise money. So, too, with desegregation, or the building of
adequate prisons, or any of a hundred other subjects. But was
the decree proper? The majority refused to consider the question, and Justice Kennedy's separate opinion, although nominally about the taxation, was directed squarely to the decree's
specification of rights. The four justices for whom Justice Ken6. "Freezing" remedies give minorities tie same benefits the majority provided for
itself at an earlier time.
7. See Missouri v.Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
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nedy spoke did not believe that equal protection requires swimming pools and air conditioning, as opposed to equal sharing
of existing schools.
What shines through about this case is that the school board
chafed under the requirement of voters' approval; it believed
that the voters were too stingy, and that it could not provide
the quality of education that children ought to receive. The litigation offered it an opportunity to enlarge its powers. Recall
that the school boardfavored the district court's remedy. This is
frequent in litigation against local governments, and decrees of
this kind simultaneously provide benefits for the plaintiffs and
liberate public officials from constraints on their own power.'
Should federal courts cooperate in this transfer of power? If so,
does the Constitution compel new construction in Kansas City?
Everything about this dispute turned on the identification of
the federal right; debating the "remedy" was a distraction impeding accurate analysis.
4. Quotas in employment. It is possible to step quickly through
other "remedial" questions, which pose variations on the
themes I have discussed. Consider employment goals and quotas. Holders of the group-rights cluster uniformly support taking race into account when hiring or promoting workers, even
if the beneficiaries of this relief have never been victims of discrimination. Holders of the individual-rights cluster regularly
Would limit consideration of race to identifying and compensating the victims of racial discrimination. Again, views about substance determine views about remedies.
The debate among the Justices in the case involving the Federal Communications Commission's preference for minorities
when handing out broadcast licenses made this exceedingly
clear.aJustice Brennan's opinion for five justices spoke approvingly of the value of a racially diverse group of broadcasters;
the preference for minorities followed directly. Justice
O'Connor's opinion for four justices emphasized the individual
basis of rights and the fact that the beneficiaries of the preference were not victims of discrimination; the impropriety of the
8. See Bates v. Johnson, 901 F.2d 1424, 1426 (7th Cir. 1990); Dunn v. Carey, 808
F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1986); Easterbrook,Justiceand Contract in Consent Decrees, 1987 U. CHi.
LEGAL

F. 19, 30-41.

9. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S. Ct.
2997 (1990).
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preference followed directly. Nothing had to do with remedies
from either perspective.
Only Franks v. Bowman Transportation,10 and a few similar

cases, present genuine remedial questions. At issue in Franks
was the question whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 authorizes "rightful-place" or super-seniority remedies
for identified victims of discrimination. The Court held that it
does. Although employees displaced by such remedies did not
themselves violate anyone else's rights, the question from an
individual-rights perspective is what is necessary to honor the
entitlements of the persons protected by Title VII. If providing
this relief would violate contractual entitlements of other employees, then the employer must make them whole as well."
That there may be more than one victim of a violation, or the
efforts to undo it, does not imply leaving the principal victim
without effective redress.
5. Jail administration. Huge disputes have followed efforts by
the judiciary to require state and local governments to provide
humane conditions of confinement. Usually these take the form
of claims that the judges are being "too intrusive" and should
defer more to local authorities. This dispute has both a substantive and a remedial component, with the former
dominating.
If the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment really requires prison cells to have 100 square feet,
or really regulates the ratio of starch to protein in the prisoners'
diet, then there is no "remedial" objection to an order requiring prisons to comply. The more detailed the constitutional
command, the more detailed the order for its implementation.
Most objections to "overly intrusive" decrees are claims that
the Constitution cannot possibly impose such a level of detailthat it is silly to find in such generalities as "cruel and unusual
punishments" a complete architectural and nutritional code.
This is a substantive objection to the decree, masquerading as a
claim about remedies.
The remedial question arises when the court's initial decree
is general (in line with the level of specificity in the Constitution itself), and the defendants use the lack of precision to
avoid its purport. They drag their heels; they resolve all ambi10. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
11. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
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guities against the plaintiffs; when the judge directs them to improve one aspect of the prison (say, overcrowding), they
retaliate by creating new problems ("The court says you must
have sixty square feet all to yourself; very well, but now you will
be all by yourself, because we are cutting out all recreation.").
Recalcitrance presents the judge with a truly remedial question:
How much control over detail must be sucked into federal
court, even on the assumption that the Constitution has nothing to do with detail? By and large, it is best to deal with determined resistance not by ever-increasing levels of regulation,
but by finding some other organ of government that will cooperate. Take control of the prisons from the Sheriff and transfer
it to the County Board; in extreme cases, create a new institution and give it the responsibility of administration. If no
branch of government will carry out the order in good faith,
transfer responsibility to a master as an adjunct of the court,
with the understanding that the master's decisions are not constitutional commands but are practical accommodations. Once
the local government shows that it is willing to live by the rules,
the court should return control to it, without requiring it to
adhere to any picayune rules developed by the court in its role
as administrator. Separating the substantive from remedial issues in this manner gives the best prospect for effective return
to political governance of public institutions.
6. Judicially-directedvoting. This leads straight to the sort of2
question (a genuine remedial question) that the Yonkers case'
presented. The court ordered the construction of public housing in white neighborhoods. The city council refused to cooperate. The district judge then ordered the council members to
vote favorably on implementation-as if the remedy depended
on their votes rather than on the judge's earlier conclusion that
the city's siting decisions violated the Constitution.
In the Yonkers case, the rights had been established, and the
remedy had been decreed. Only putting the remedy into force
remained. A majority of the Court concluded that a district
judge ought not force the defendants to act as if they agreed
with the remedy. They may choose to have the remedy carried
out over protest. Rather than requiring the defendants to give
public signs of assent, the court should direct their conduct
12. See Spallone v. United States, 110 S.

Ct. 625 (1990).
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substantively-and name others to act in their places if they will
not.
So there are a few cases in which the goals are agreed and
prudential questions of remedy dominate. By and large, however, the choice of remedy follows from the choice of objective.
That choice is substantive, and the pretense that there is a distinct "remedial" question obscures the nature of the real
question.
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